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AIRPORT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO MUNICIPALITIES--1941t
By JOHN M. HUNTER, JR. AND LEWIS H. ULMAN*
Just as the national defense emergency has made itself felt in
many other fields, so was it largely responsible during the past year
for many legal developments of particular interest to city attorneys,
of which a large number have had to do with airports. In large
measure, it appears that these developments may be attributed to the
airport needs of the Army and Navy, many of them either filling such
needs directly or facilitating the defense airport programs of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration and other Federal agencies.
With 43 State Legislatures meeting last year in regular session,
these developments include a large volume of State legislation de-
signed to correct deficiencies in the laws relating to airports, particu-
larly those giving municipalities and other political subdivisions the
powers necessary to permit them to effectively establish, develop,
operate, maintain, protect, and regulate airports. In addition, the
year 1941 saw several Federal statutes enacted, Federal regulations
promulgated, State cases decided, and legal opinions rendered which
should be of interest to municipal law officers.
These developments will be discussed under three main headings,
as follows: (1) Airport Development; (2) Airport Operation and
Regulation; and (3) Airport Protection.
(1) AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT
Federal Airport Programs
As was pointed out in our review of airport legal developments
for 1940,' the passage, of the First Supplemental Civil. Functions
Appropriation Act, by the 76th Congress on October 9, 1940,2 con-
taining an appropriation to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
t Substantially as prepared by the authors for the Committee on Airports of the
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers and used by that Committee in making
Its report at the annual meeting of the Institute In Washington, December 4-6, 1941,
to be published in the Institute's "Municipalities and the Law in Action for 1941."
* Attorneys with Civil Aeronautics Administration, U. S. Department of Com-
merce ; Members of District of Columbia Bar.
1. 12 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 148.
2. Public 812, 76th Congress, 3d Session.
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of $40,000,000 for public airport development, heralded a new day
for municipal airports. By this Act, Congress for the first time
recognized the vital place of the public airport in civil aeronautics
and in the national defense.
The passage of this Act and of three subsequent appropriations
for the same purpose 3 is selected as a starting point in this report;
since a large number of recent airport legal developments of interest
to municipal law officers are connected with or incidental to the oper-
ation of the CAA airport programs.
Since October 9, 1940, $199,593,050 has been appropriated and
479 airports and airport sites have been selected by the Administrator
of Civil Aeronautics for development and approved by a board con-
sisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Commerce, as necessary
for national defense. The mechanics of the program are undoubtedly
familiar to many municipal law officers as a result of first hand ex-
perience; however, for the uninitiate, it should be noted that the
following legal steps are taken after the selection of the project:
(1) The principal officer of the city selected as sponsor of the project
is notified of the selection and is requested to advise the Adminis-
trator by letter whether the city is willing to sponsor the project.
(2) When this answer is received, if in the affirmative, plans for
development are prepared by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
and the city is advised what land will be necessary for the proposed
development. (3) After the city has acquired fee simple unencum-
bered title to all the lands to be developed, a resolution must be
adopted by the project sponsor agreeing to assume certain obligations
in connection with the operation and maintenance of the airport.
When this resolution is accepted by the Administrator, construction
contracts may be awarded, or funds released to the WPA, according
to the nature of the project, and the actual construction may be placed
under way.
Under the terms of the CAA form resolution the project sponsor
must agree to allow the Government a free hand in development of
the project, to indemnify the Government for any claims arising out
of the project other than claims for material furnished or services
performed; to operate the airport during its useful life in the public
interest ;. to grant no exclusive right within the meaning of Section
303 of the Civil Aeronautics Act; to maintain and keep in repair
the entire landing area; to protect the airport's aerial approaches
insofar as is legally possible; and not to enter into any transaction
3. Public Laws 135, 247, and 353, 77th Congress, 1st Session.
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which would render the sponsor unable to carry out the covenants
and agreements of the resolution. In addition, the sponsor must war-
rant, inter alia, that it has unencumbered fee simple title to the prop-
erty and the power to adopt the resolution.
No attempt will be made at this point to show how the pro-
visions and these agreements are correlated with the State legisla-
tion, court actions, and legal opinions of the past year; however, it is
believed that if the reader will keep in mind the CAA project eligi-
bility requirements, he will see that they explain many of these State
and local airport legal developments.
Lease of Public Lands
In addition to the above, there was one other legal development
during the year with respect to Federal action in the field of civil
airport development which is deserving of mention here. This was
the enactment by the 77th Congress of an act approved August 16,
1941,4 which amended the Act of May 24, 1928,1 authorizing lease
of public lands for public airport purposes, by changing the limita-
tion on the area that may be leased for any particular airport from
640 acres to 2,560. As a result, in those States where public lands
are still available, it is now possible for a city, other public agency,
or private person to lease as much as four sections of such lands for
development as a public airport.
State Legislation
Turning to State legislation it is apparent that such legislation
is highly important to the development of municipal airports. For
one thing, political subdivisions are generally dependent upon State
enabling legislation for many of the powers necessary to permit them
to establish and develop airports, this being true even of "home-
rule" cities to some extent. And secondly, the States are often in a
position to be of considerable assistance to their political sub-
divisions in this regard, both legislatively and administratively.
Consequently, it should be gratifying to all city attorneys that
the past year has witnessed an unprecedented volume of State legis-
lation designed to correct deficiencies in State airport laws and other-
wise facilitate the development of municipal airports and the Federal
airport development programs." It is believed that these acts indicate
4. Public 205, 77th Congress. 1st Session.
5. 45 Stat. 728.
6. In this report alone, mention is made of no less than 78 acts adopted during
1941 in 33 States.
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a growing realization and acceptance of the place and responsibilties
of State government in the airport picture.
State Aid
This is particularly true of the statutes enacted providing for
administrative action by an agency of the State Government in the
field of airport development. These included acts adopted in ten
States authorizing State agencies to acquire land and construct and
operate airports thereon 7 together with an act passed in another
State which provided that the aviation gasoline tax refund, un-
claimed for four months, could be used to construct flight strips
adjacent to public highways." In addition three other States by legis-
lation directed their aviation bodies to encourage and promote the
development of airports and the establishment of air navigation
facilities.9
Of greater interest to municipal law officers, however, are the
several statutes which have been enacted, providing for State assist-
ance, financial and other, to political subdivisions in the development
of municipal airports. These include five acts which authorize the
four new State aeronautics commissions created last year to assist
the political subdivisions of the State in the development of their
airports,10 as well as several authorizing use of State owned or con-
trolled lands for municipal airport purposes. As examples of the
latter, New York has adopted an act authorizing the State Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene to turn over twenty-two acres of land to
the City of Utica for expansion of its airports,' New Jersey an act
permitting acquisition of land adjacent to municipal water land for
public airport purposes, 12 Idaho a statute authorizing lease of State
owned land, adjacent to public airports, for use in connection there-
with,'8 and Texas a law increasing the amount of State lands that
may be leased for an airport from 640 acres to 1,280.14
In this connection, two recent State Attorney General opinions
should be noted which indicate that State Governmental agencies.
7. Ariz. L. 1941, c. 6: Ark. Acts 1941. no. 457; Calif. Stats. 1941, c. 753 (Ntl.
Guard) ; Ga. L. 1941, no. 393 : Mass. L. 1941, c. 268 (Bedford) ; Mich. Acts 1941, no.
333; N. H. L. 1941, c. 199; Oreg. L. 1941, c. 54; Tenn. Acts 1941, c. 164 ; Vt. L.
1941, no. 100 and 101.
8. Minn. L. 1941, c. 491.
9. Kans. L. 1941, H. J. Res. 7; Me. L. 1941, c. 236: N. C. L. 1941, S. B. 291.
10. Ark. Acts 1941, no. 457: Me. L. 1941, c. 236; N. H. L. 1941, c. 199 :; Vt. L.
1941 no. 100 and 101.
11. N. Y. L. 1941, c. 597.
12. N. J. L. 1941, c. 11.
13. Idaho L. 1941, c. 6.
14. Tex. L. 1941. H. B. 216.
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like municipalities, sometimes find themselves without sufficient
authority to take some particular action in connection with the
development of an airport. One of these was an opinion given by
the Attorney General of Vermont in connection with the develop-
ment of an airport at West Lebanon, New Hampshire. 5 This air-
port, which serves White River Junction, Vermont, and the sur-
rounding territory as well as West Lebanon and Hanover on the
New Hampshire side of the Connecticut River, was selected for
development under the Civil Aeronautics Administration airport
program and $409,000 in Federal funds was allocated for this pur-
pose. The question then was presented, could the Vermont Aero-
nautics Board share a portion of the expense entailed in the acqui-
sition of the necessary land? Two acts were passed in Vermont
during 1941 to authorize cooperation with the Federal Government
on airport projects;16 however, the Attorney General in his opinion
held the language used in these acts precluded extra-state expen-
ditures.
Still another restriction on the power of the States was expressed
in a recent opinion of the Attorney General of Georgia.1 7 It was
his opinion that the Governor, in the absence of statutory authori-
zation, could not properly lease certain prison lands to the Federal
Government for development as an airport.
Airport Enabling Legislation
This same desire on the part of the State Legislatures to facili-
tate the development of airports is evidenced by the many acts
passed during the year designed to provide municipalities and other
political subdivisions with the basic authority to develop airports,
or to cure defects in, or further implement, existing airport develop-
ment enabling legislation. No less than 42 acts of this type
were passed last year.18 Of these, 14 apply to all cities and
15. Vt. Att. Gen. Op. to Vt. Aeronautics Board, June 16, 1941, 235 CCHI 1906.
16. Supra, n. 7.
17. Ga. Att. Gen. Op., Feb. 25, 1941, 235 CCH 4034.
18. Ariz. L. 1941, c. 5 (cities, towns, and counties) and c. 28 (cities and towns)
Calif. L. 1941, c. 265 (counties), c. 630 (irrigation districts), and c. 52 (Monterey
airport district) Del. L. 1.941 S. B. 207 (New Castle County) and S. B. 243 (Sussex
County) : Fla. L. 1941 c. 20861 (cities where two or more counties act jointly) :
Ga. L. 1941, S. B. 214 (counties bordering on another State and cities in such coun-
ties) ; Idaho L. 1941, c. 103 (cities and counties) and c. 172 (first class cities) ; Ill.
L. 1941, S. B. 61 (counties), S. B. 511 (citids and villages over 150,000 bordering on
public waters), and S. B. 372 (aviation districts) ; Kans. L. 1941, S. B. 37 (counties
bordering on or contiguous to two or more cities of over 1115,000), S. B. 38 (cities).
S. B. 265 (first class cities), and I-. B. 366 (cities acting Jointly) and H-. B. 177(certain cities) Me. L. 1941, c. 173 (cities and counties) ; Md. L. 1941, c. 651 (City
of Cumberland) Mass. L. 1941, c. 469 (Beverly); Mich. L. 1941, Pub. Acts 333
(State Administrative Board, cities, counties, villages, and townships); Minn. L.
1941, c. 264 (certain classes of counties) ; Mont. L. 1941, c. 54 (counties, cities, and
towns) ; N. H. L. 1941, c. 272 (Laconia) and c. 199 (cities and counties) ; N. J. L.
AIRPORT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
counties, 19 3 to all counties, 20 6 to all cities,21 1 to irrigation dis-
tricts,22 1 to park districts,2 3 1 to certain classes of cities and coun-
ties,u 3 to certain classes of counties, 25 4 to certain classes of cities, 28
3 to particular cities and counties,27 3 to particular counties, 28 and 3
to particular cities. 29
While it would no doubt be desirable, it is not possible in a
report of this type to discuss these acts in detail, State by State,
pointing out the changes that have been effected. We shall, however,
make reference to several of them below in discussing certain of the
most important features of this airport enabling legislation.
Thus, to supply a deficiency pointed out in our last year's review
of airport legal developments,"0 no less than sixteen acts were passed
last year, granting to classes of political subdivisions previously with-
out such authority the basic power to establish and develop airports.3 '
Included, it is interesting to note, is an act of the Illinois Legislature
authorizing all counties of the State to develop airports,3 2 which was
apparently occasioned by an opinion of the. Attorney General of
Illinois reported in our article last year.'3
In addition to this general authorization, airport enabling acts
almost invariably contain provisions expressly authorizing the po-
litical subdivisions with which they are concerned to do certain
1941, c. 8 (cities) ; N. M. L. 1941, c. 60 (cities) ; N. Y. L. 1941, c. 606 (counties, cities,
towns, and villages) ; N. C. L. 1941, c. 292 (Raleigh-Durham) and S. B. 138 (Greens-
boro-High Point) ; N. D. L. 1941, H. B. 176 (park districts) and H. B. 186 (cities) :
Oreg. L. 1941, c. 189 (cities and counties) ; Pa. L. 1941, c. 144 (second through
seventh class counties) ; S. D. L. 1941, c. 250 (counties, cities, and towns) ; Tex. L.
1941, H. B. 216 (counties and cities) and S. B. 129 (cities over 40,000) ; Vt. L.
1941, c. 53 (cities and counties) ; Wash. L. 1941, c. 21 (cities, towns, counties, and
gort districts) ; Wyo. L. 1941, c. 35 (counties). See also Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 702 and
. B. 10, and Pa. L. 1941, c. 321 and 334. Copies of these acts were not available
at the time this article was prepared.
19. Supra, n. 18. Ariz. L. 1941, c. 5; Fla. L. 1941, c. 20861; Idaho L. 1941, c.
103; Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 372; Me. L. 1941, c. 173; Mich. L. 1941, Pub. Acts 333:
Mont. L. 1941, c. 54; N. H. L. 1941, c. 199; N. Y. L. 1941, c. 606; Oreg. L. 1941, c.
189; S. D. L. 1941, c. 250; Tex. L. 1941, H. B. 216; Vt. L. 1941, c. 53; Wash. L.
1941, c. 21.
20. Supra, n. 18. Calif. L. 1941, c. 265 ; Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 61 ; Wyo. L. 1941,
c. 35.
21. Supra, n. 18. Ariz. L. 1941, c. 28; Kans. L. 1941, S. B. 38 and H. B. 366;
N. J. L. 1941, c. 8; N. M. L. 1941, c. 60; ; N. D. L. 1941, H. B. 186.
22. Supra, n. 18. Calif. L. 1941, c. 630.
23. N. D. L. 1941, H. B3. 176.
24. Ga. L. 1941, S. B. 214.
25. Supra, n. 18. Kans. L. 1941, S. B. 37; Minn. L. 1941, c. 264 ; Pa. L. 1941,
c. 144.
26. Supra, n. 18. Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 511 ; Idaho L. 1941, c. 172; Kans. L. 1941,
S. B. 265; Tex. L. 1941, S. B. 129.
27. Supra, n. 18. N. H. L. 1941, c. 272; N. C. L. 1941, c. 292 and S. B. 138.
28. Supra, n. 18. Calif. L. 1941, c. 52; Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207 and S. B. 243.
29. Supra, n. 18. Kans. L. 1941, H. B. 177; Md. L. 1941, c. 651; Mass. L.
1941, c. 469.
30. Supra, n. 1, at p. 149.
31. Calif. L. 1941, c. 630 and c. 52; Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207 and S. B. 243; Fla.
L. 1941, c. 20861; Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 61 and S. B. 372 ; Kans. L. 1941, S. B. 37, S. B.
265, and H. B. 366; Md. L. 1941, c. 651 ; N. H. L. 1941, c. 272; N. C. L. 1941, S. B.
138; Oreg. L. 1941, c. 189; Pa. L. 1941, c. 144; Wyo. L. 1941, c. 35.
32. Supra, n. 18. Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 61.
33. Supra, n. 1, at p. 149.
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things and exercise certain particular powers in connection with the
development of their airports. Such provisions are found in all of
the new airport enabling acts and amendments to prior acts of this
type which were passed last year.3 4
Acquisition of Land
One such power, that to acquire the land to be developed as an
airport, whether by grant, purchase, condemnation or other means,
would seem to be inherent in the basic power to establish and develop
airports and to need no express legislative authorization. This view
finds authoritative support in the case of Burnhami v. Beverly 5 de-
cided June 24, 1941, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
In that case Justice Rowan held that a municipality could properly
condemn land for airport purposes even though no express authori-
zation to such effect was contained in the municipal airport enabling
act if the municipality was otherwise authorized to condemn land
for public purposes. The opinion is notable for its collection of the
decided cases holding that the development of a municipal airport
is a proper public purpose, 0 on which ground the holding was of
course based.
Nevertheless, most of the States have obviated this question by
including in their airport enabling acts provisions expressly granting
political subdivisions the power to acquire land for airport purposes
by the several usual methods. This is true of all of the 16 basic
airport enabling acts adopted last year,3 7 while 8 of the remaining
acts mentioned above as general enabling legislation, contained like
provisions 38
Condemnation
In addition, the need for speed in the acquisition of lands re-
quired for airport development, particularly in the national defense
program, has resulted in several enactments amending State con-
demnation laws to provide a more expeditious condemnation pro-
cedure than that previously in effect. Unlike the Federal procedure,
which permits the condemnor to take immediate possession of the
property upon the filing of a "declaration of taking,"39 and that of
.4. ,Supra, n. 18.
35. 35 N. E. (2d) 242 (June 24, 1941).
36. See article cited supra, n. 1, at p. 151 ; also Lewis 11. Ulman, "The Public
Nature of Airports," Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, at p. 198 (Decem-
ber, 1941).
37. Supra, n. 31.
38. Calif. L. 1941, c. 265; Me. L. 1941, c. 173; Mass. L. 1941, c. 469; Mont.
L. 1941, c. 54; N. M. L. 1941, c. 60; Tex. L. 1941, S. B. 129; Vt. L. 1941, c. 53;
Wash. L. 1941, c. 21.
39. 45 Stat. 1421, 40 U. S. C. A. §§258a-258e.
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several of the States, which also provides for the taking of possession
without awaiting determination of the amount of the award, many
of the States still require that the condemnation proceedings be
completed before the condemnor may take possession. It is under-
stood that the existence of condemnation laws of this type has seri-
ously delayed several national defense projects, including some
projects involving acquisition by a municipality of land to be used
by the military services and some projects for the development of
municipal airports.
However, the number of States having such condemnation laws
has been somewhat reduced during the present year, at least so far
as condemnation for airport purposes is concerned. For example, in
New Mexico an act was passed amending the general condemnation
laws to permit possession prior to determination of the award, thus
making possible entry upon land to begin construction of an airport
thereon, when condemnation proceedings have been instituted but
not finally adjudicated. 40 And, in New Hampshire, the same result
was obtained by inclusion in the State's general aeronautics act of a
provision authorizing the Governor and council, upon recommenda-
tion of the director of aeronautics, to acquire, by purchase, grant,
or condemnation, land needed for airport purposes and to convey
such land to a town "for such a consideration as the Governor and
Council may determine. '41 It is understood that the procedure
authorized in cases of condemnation by the Governor and Council
permits immediate possession to be taken whereas that followed
where land is condemned by a town does not.
In addition to these acts, Delaware 42 in a special act applying
to one county, authorized "pretakings," and Arkansas43 applied the
principle generally to removal of airport approach obstructions.
It is suggested that the States requiring determination of the
award before possession may be taken in condemnation proceedings
would considerably expedite and facilitate the national defense pro-
gram and at the same time advance the cause of aviation and their
own interests, if they were to amend their condemnation laws to
permit "pre-takings" in the cases of land needed by a political sub-
division for airport purposes.
In this connection, mention should be made of a case decided
last year on the power of a municipality to condemn lesser interests
40. N. M. L. 1941, c. 60.
41. N. H. L. 1941, c. 199, §11.
42. Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207.
43. Ark. L. 1941. c. 116.
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in airport land. This was the case of Danbury Airport Corporation v.
Danbury,44 in which the Superior Court of Connecticut at Bridge-
port upheld the power of the Town of Danbury to condemn a twenty
year lease which it had granted to the plaintiff corporation. This
case may prove of value to some of the many municipalities faced
with the necessity of cancelling or amending airport leases or other
airport agreements or extinguishing other encumbrances upon their
cities' title to airport property, in order to meet the project eligibility
requirements established by the Government in connection with its
several airport programs.
Extraterritorial Powers
Still another airport power which must often be expressly
granted to political subdivisions is the power to exercise their other
airport powers outside their territorial limits. During the past year,
no less than 11 States found it necessary to enact legislation granting
such extraterritorial powers, 4 and in two of these cases, authorizing
their political subdivisions to establish and develop airports not only
outside their corporate limits but in adjoining States as well. 46 Of
these latter two acts, that of Maryland is of particular interest in
that it provides an excellent example of inter-State cooperation in
airport development. The City of Cumberland, Maryland, had been
selected as a sponsor of a WPA airport defense project and $2,-
030,212 of Federal funds had been allocated for development of the
project. The most suitable site, however, was at Ridgeley, across
the Potomac River, in West Virginia, and Maryland municipalities
were riot authorized to locate their airport without the State. The
Maryland Legislature, however, solved the problem by granting legis-
lative authority to locate the airport outside the State and expend
municipal funds therefor,'7 and West Virginia reciprocated by en-
acting a statute authorizing political subdivisions of adjoining States
to locate their airports within the limits of the State of West Vir-
ginia.48 As another method of solving this problem, Massachusetts
this year enacted a statute changing the boundary between Fitchburg
and Leominster so that a proposed airport site would be situated
entirely within the corporate limits of the former.49 Similarly, al-
44. No official citation available. See Bridgeport Post, Bridgeport, Conn., April
15, 1941.
45. Fla. L. 1941, c. 20861 ; Idaho L. 1941, c. 172 ; I1. L. 1941, S. B. 511: Md.
L. 1941, c. 651 ; Mich. Acts 1941, no. 333; N. Y. L. 1941, c. 606; Okla. L. 1941, S. B.152; Oreg. L. 1941, c. 189: S. D. TL. 1941, H-. B. 250; Tex. L. 1941, S. B. 129 ; Wash.
L. 1941, c. 21.
46. Md. L. 1941, c. 651 ; S. D. L. 1941, 11. B. 250.
47. Supra, n. 46.
48. W. Va. L. 1941, H. B. 368.
49. Mass. L. 1941, c. 37.
124,
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though available records do not indicate whether this was the purpose
of the statute, a legislative change has been made in the boundaries
of Carson City, Nevada, resulting in inclusion of a proposed airport
site within the city limits.50
Airport Financing
Another problem that received considerable legislative attention
last year was that of financing the development of municipal and other
public airports. While the major portion of the cost of such develop-
ment is borne by the Federal Government in connection with the
WPA and CAA airport programs, most of the cost of construction
of hangars, administration buildings, and other structures and facili-
ties necessary to such an airport, and all of that of acquiring the
necessary land, must still be borne by the municipality or other
political subdivision.
To provide a means of meeting these capital expenses, most of
the States have included in their airport enabling acts provisions
authorizing the political subdivisions empowered to establish airports
to sell long term bonds. This is the case with respect to 19 of the 42
airport enabling acts passed last year,"1 all of these 19 authorizing
such borrowing to finance the acquisition of land and 1552 to defray
the costs of the airport construction or development.
Usually, a statute authorizing such borrowing provides that the
bonds may be issued on the general credit of the political subdivision
in question, to be repaid either from general revenues or from the
revenues from special taxes levied each year in an amount sufficient
to pay the year's principal and interest. This is true of all 1941 acts
mentioned in the preceding paragraph except three, 53 which specify
that the bonds shall not be a general obligation of the political sub-
division but instead shall be secured by a lien on the airport revenues
or on the airport property.
In this connection, it should be noted that in addition to the
16 acts authorizing political subdivisions to borrow on their general
50. Nev. L. 1941, c. 86.
51. Ariz. L. 1941, c. 28: Calif. L. 1941, c. 52; Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207 and S. B.
243; ; Fla. L. 1941, c. 20861 ; Idaho L. 1941, c. 103 and c. 172; 11. L. 1941, S. B. 61,
S. B. 511, and S. B. 372; Kans. L. 1941, B. B. 37, S. B. 38, and H. B. 366; Md. L.
1941, c. 651; Mich. L. 1941, Pub. Acts 333; Mont. L. 1941, c. 54; N. C. L. 1941,
S. B. 138; Oreg. L. 1941, c. 189; Tex. L. 1941, S. B. 129. Note: The Pennsylvania
Act, L. 1941, c. 144, is not included since a copy of this Act is not available at this
time and consequently it is not possible to determine its financial provisions.
52. Calif. L. 1941, c. 52; Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207 and S. B. 243; Idaho L. 1941,
c. 103 and c. 172; II1. L. 1941, S. B. 61, S. B. 511, and S. B. 372; Kans. L. 1941,
S. B. 38 and H. B. 366; Md. L. 1941, c. 651 ; Mich. L. 1941, Pub. Acts 333;; Mont. L.
1941, c. 54; N. C. L. 1941, S. D. 138; Tex. L. 1941, S. B. 129.
53. Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 511 and S. B. 372; N. C. L. 1941, S. B. 138.
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credit, which also expressly or impliedly authorize the levying of
taxes either to meet airport costs without borro wing or to repay
airport bonds, 3 do not authorize borrowing but do expressly em-'
power the political subdivisions in question to raise the funds needed
for airport acquisition and development either by appropriating funds
from their general revenues or by leving special airport taxes. 54
However, there are often constitutional or statutory limitations
on the power of political subdivisions to tax and borrow making it
impossible in a particular case to issue general obligation bonds for
airport purposes without additional legislation. To remedy this
situation, it is of interest that three States during the year 1941
adopted acts authorizing particular cities or counties to borrow for
airport purposes in excess of their statutory debt limits55 and that
two States authorized the levy of airport taxes in certain cases, in
excess of their maximum tax limits.6 Also, one 'act was adopted
enabling cities and counties to appropriate funds for airport purposes
in excess of their annual budgets. 57
In addition to these devices, three of the year's airport enabling
acts, as previously noted," authorize the issuance of airport bonds
secured by a pledge of airport revenues or a lien on the airport
property. As is usual in this type of legislation, it is provided in
these acts that the bonds shall not be considered a debt of the political
subdivision, the result being that the State's constitutional or statu-
tory debt limit does not apply. However, the absence of any general
obligation may make the sale of such bonds impossible, and in addi-
tion, where the bond holder acquires a lien or mortgage on the land,
the title held by the political subdivision would seem to be so encum-
bered as to disqualify that public agency for a CAA airport project
under the project eligibility rules of that Federal agency.
As a variation of this means of avoiding the State debt restric-
tions, two acts were adopted providing for the creation of "airport
authorities" to act on behalf of one or more political subdivisions
in airport matters.59 Such authorities are usually public bodies of
the Government corporation type, having the power to acquire prop-
erty, borrow money, and sue and be sued. Lacking the power to
tax, it might be necessary for such an authority, in order to sell its
bonds, to secure them by a lien on the airport property, which as
54. Calif. L. 1941, c. 265 ;Kans. L. 1941, 1 11. 177 : Vt. L. 1941, c. 54.
55. Ariz. L. 1941, c. 28" N. J. L. 1941, c. 8 : Md. L. 1941, c. 651.
56. Kans. L. 1941, S. B. 37 and H. B. 177; N. D. L. 1941, H. B. 176 and
H. B. 186.
57. Idaho L. 1941, c. 103.
58. Supra, n. 53.
59. N. H. L. 1941, c. 272; N. C, L. 1941, S. B. 138.
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previously indicated, would make the airport ineligible for develop-
ment under the CAA airport program. On the other hand, however,
it is sometimes possible for such an authority to borrow on its general
credit or on some security other than the land, as by pledging future
airport revenues.
Before leaving this subject, mention should be made of three
recent legal opinions on the airport financing powers of political sub-
divisions. One of these was an opinion given by the Attorney General
of Alabama to a County,60 advising that the Cobnty could enter into
a fifteen year airport lease in conjunction with other political sub-
divisions, at a $5,000 yearly rental, in spite of a restriction in the
Alabama Code that no obligation may be incurred by a County that
cannot be satisfied out of the current year's revenues. The theory
was that since the lease was to be terminable by the lessees at the
end of any year the credit of the County would not be obligated for
a period beyond a year.
In the same vein is the case of Miles v. Lee,61 which while
decided in 1940, was not reported in our review for 1941. In that
case, the members of the Fiscal Court and the members of the Louis-
ville and Jefferson County Air Board, owners of the airport, as indi-
viduals, had entered into agreements with a group of banks whereby
the banks were to advance the Board the amount needed to pay an
award for land condemned for expansion of the Louisville Municipal
Airport, taking a lien on the land condemned as security. The mem-
bers of the Fiscal Court agreed to vote to levy a tax sufficient to
enable.the Board to discharge the lien and to authorize the Board
to borrow in anticipation of the tax if necessary, and further agreed
to see to it that the loan was repaid, while the members of the Board
agreed to vote both to request the County to levy a tax and to borrow,
if necessary, and also agreed to repay the loan. Among other objec-
tions, it was claimed that the Board had exceeded its borrowing
power in that it obligated itself beyond the current fiscal year in
violation of a provision of the Kentucky Constitution. But the Court
held that this financing plan did not create a present indebtedness
on the part of the Air Board to be paid out of future revenues. It
ruled that the Board would be under no legal obligation to repay
the banks and that since the banks would have title under the lien,
the Air Board would not actually acquire the land and become liable
for its purchase price unless and until it elected to discharge the
60. Ala. Att. Gen. Op. to Chairman, Morgan County Board of Revenue and
Control, July 10, 1941, 235 CCIH 1911.
61. 143 S. W. (2d) 843 (Ky., Oct. 15, 1940).
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lien at the beginning of the new fiscal year when the banks would
be paid with the proceeds from sale of that year's tax anticipation
notes.
A further example of liberal interpretation of an airport finance
measure is seen in a decision of the Attorney General of Texas. 62
It was his ruling that a State statute authorizing counties to issue
negotiable bonds for airport purposes, conditioned upon a favorable
vote of the electorate, did not negative the implied power to sell
non-negotiable, interest-bearing time warrants without a vote of the
people. This opinion is of particular interest in connection with the
discussion of the necessity for electoral approval of municipal appro-
priations for airport purposes contained in our 1940 review. 8
Joint Airports
Closely related to this subject of airport financing is that of
joint airports, one of the principal reasons for joint action in the
development and operation of an airport by two or more political
subdivisions being that this spreads the financial burden of develop-
ment, operation, maintenance, protection, and regulation of an air-
port over the residents of a larger portion of the area to be served
by it than is the case where an airport is supported by one munici-
pality, or even one county.6 4 To permit such collaboration, a number
of the States last year adopted enabling legislation on the subject.
Of these acts, six authorize joint action by two or more cities, 5 ten
provide for such cooperation between political subdivisions of dif-
ferent classes, such as counties and cities or cities and towns,6 and
three empower political subdivisions of the State to join with those
of an adjoining State.61 In most of these cases, the procedural details
are left to local determination; however, two of these acts authorize
political subdivisions wishing to join in the development and oper-
ation of an airport to create an airport authority to represent them
as their agent. s
62. Tex. Att. Gen. Op. to Kaufman County Att., May 1, 1941, 235 CCH 1904.
63. Supra, n. 1, at p. 151.
64. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see Emil F. Jarz, "Intermunict-
pal Cooperation in Establishing, Maintaining, and Operating Airports," Journal of
Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 4, P. 301 (October, 1941).
65. Idaho L. 1941, c. 103; Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 372; Kans. L. 1941, § .B. 38 and
H. B. 366; Oreg. L. 1941, c. 189; Wash. L. 1941, c. 21.
66. Calif. Stat. 1941, c. 265; Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207 (Special Act) ; Fla. L.
1941, c. 20861 ; Idaho L. 1941, c. 103; Minn. L. 1941, c. 264; Mont. L. 1941, c. 54 ;
N. Y. L. 1941, c. 606; Ore. L. 1941, c. 189; S. D. L. 1941, H. B. 250; Wash. L. 1941,
c. 21.
67. Del. L. 1941, S. B. 207; Ga. L. 1941, S. B. 214; N. H. L. 1941, c. 199.
68. N. H. L. 1941, c. 272; N. C. L. 1941 ,S. B. 138.
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Airport Districts
But perhaps the most noteworthy development of the year'Iwith
respect to airport financing was the enactment of State legislation
providing for airport development and operation by a functional
type of political subdivision, usually known as an "airport district,"
with boundaries coextensive with the area to be served by the air-
port and powers independent of the municipalities and counties
within such area. If given the power to tax, such airport districts
are believed to offer in many respects-the best solution of the airport
financing problem.
Up until 1941, this type of airport legislation was in effect in
only two States69 and in those States had never been invoked. But
last year the State of California, although one of the two States
already having such a general act, adopted a special act creating the
Monterey Peninsula Airport District, specifically providing that
such District should have the power to tax.7
In addition, it should be noted that Illinois has recently enacted
legislation 7 1 which, while it authorizes incorporation of any two or
more contiguous counties or contiguous portions thereof as an
aviation district, by vote of the legal voters residing therein, and
authorizes such districts to establish airports, does not authorize
such districts to levy taxes and in fact stipulates that airport bonds
issued by an aviation district shall not constitute an indebtedness
of the district but shall be payable solely from airport revenues and
secured by a mortgage lien on the airport and it facilities. In view
of these limitations on their powers, it would seem that, so far as
financing is concerned, such aviation districts not only are subject
to the same disadvantages as are airport authorities72 but are even
less advantageous in that there is no provision for contribution of
funds to them by the cities served by the airports they establish.
(2) AIRPORT OPERATION AND REGULATION
Report of Nichols Committee
Considering first the year's legal developments in this field
resulting from action by the Federal Government, an excellent intro-
duction is furnished by the preliminary report issued July 10, 1941,78
69. Calif. L. 1929, p. 1857; Mass. L. 1939, c. 393.
70. Calif. L. 1941, c. 52.
71. Il1. L. 1941, S. B. 372.
72. See discussion supra regarding the acts cited In n. 59.
73. House Report No. 933, 77th Congress.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
by the Select Committee to Investigate Air Accidents of the House
of Representatives, 74 headed by Representative Nichols of Oklahoma.
In this report several recommendations were made which, if enacted
into law, would have a far-reaching effect on civil aviation and
municipal airports. The most important of these from the view point
of the municipal law officer were: (1) that the Federal Government
assume jurisdiction over all navigable air space; (2) that Federal
legislation be enacted establishing minimum requirements for airport
lighting; (3) that the Federal Government train airport control tower
operators; and (4) that at least one man in each airport control tower
shift be under the supervision of the CAA 5
With respect to the first two of these recommendations, it should
be noted that the Civil Aeronautics Board has adopted an amendment
to the Civil Air Regulations requiring all pilots and aircraft to have
Federal certifications, 70 while a bill was pending in Congress at the
end of the last session which would have effectuated the second
recommendation.7
7
As regards the Committee's recommendations as to airport traffic
control, it is of interest that Congress last year appropriated $500,000
to the Civil Aeronautics Administration for the maintenance and op-
eration of airport traffic control towers at 39 public airports.78 How:
ever, it should be borne in mind that, by the terms of this legislation,
the funds appropriated for this purpose are to be used only where
the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy certifies that "the
accomplishment of such work is essential to the national defense,"
and that such certification has been restricted to cases of airports
jointly occupied by military and civil aviation.
"True Lights"
Also of interest in this field is Federal regulation of "true lights,"
meaning airport and other beacons operated as aids to air navigation.
Ever since 1926, it has been unlawful to operate such a light without
obtaining "lawful authority"79 or to exhibit with intent to interfere
with air navigation any light likely to be mistaken for such a "true
light". 0 However, it was not until last year that regulations were
74. As created by House Res. 125, 77th Congress.
75. Supra, n. 73, at p.,7.
76. CAB Regulations No. 193, Oct. 10,' 1941 adopting Amendment No. 135 of
Civil Air Regulations amending sections 60.30 and 60.31, effective Dec. 1, 1941.
77. S. 1717, 77th Congress, 1st session : introduced by Senator McCarran July
3, 1941 ; referred to Committee on Commerce.
78. Public 247, 77th Congress.
79. Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended, §11(e).
80. Ibid and Civil Aero. Act of 1938, as amended. §902(c).
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promulgated by a Government agency to implement the statutes on
this subject. These regulations, as issued by the Administrator of
Civil Aeronautics,8 1 prescribe certain requirements as to location,
characteristics and performance to be met by six types of "true
lights," including a requirement that they be operated from sunset
to sunrise, and require that each such light not operated by a Federal
agency have an air navigation facility certificate and rating, and that
none be extinguished without permission.
Notice of Hazards
Also issued by the Administrator during 1941 was a regulation
requiring notice of the construction or alteration of structures along
or within 20 miles of a civil airway, to a height in excess of 150 feet
above ground level, 100 feet above navigable water, or 1/100 its
distance from a recognized landing area.8 2 This regulation does not
in any way attempt to control the manner in which any structure is
constructed or altered, nor does it attempt to prevent such construc-
tion, or alteration. Its sole purpose is to obtain information needed
to warn aircraft pilots of construction constituting a potential hazard
to air commerce. In this respect, this regulation is like Regulation 76
of the former Civil Aeronautics Authority,88 which it supersedes.
Exclusive Rights
As a final development in the field of Federal regulation of air-
ports during the year 1941, municipal law officers will be interested
in an Opinion of the Attorney General of the United States8" on a
question which was discussed at some length in our 1940 article,8 5
namely, whether an exclusive right to operate a charter flying service,
a flying school, or other commercial flying service at an airport im-
proved with Federal funds is in conflict with the exclusive right
provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The ruling was that
in the usual case, "the grant of an exclusive right to use (such) an
airport for a particular aeronautical activity" constitutes a violation
of the Act. However, the opinion went on to state that this "does
not mean that in administering the provisions of Section 303 it is
necessary to permit such competition as would endanger the safety
81. See "Obstruction Marking Manual," Part 1, U. S. Department of Com-
merce, CAA, June 1, 1941.
82. Regulations of the Adm. of Civil Aeronautics, Part 525, effective Nov. 1.
1941. The regulation Is set out In full in 13 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 72.
83. Civil Aeronautics Regulations Serial No. 76, effective July 16, 1940.
84. 40 Att. Gen. Op. No. 15 (June 4, 1941).
85. Supra, n. 1, at p. 153.
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of the public and of persons engaged in air commerce." In other
words, it appears that an exclusive right to use an airport upon which
Federal funds have been spent, for any particular commercial activity
involving the landing and taking-off of aircraft, is in conflict with the
statute unless required in the interests of safety.
State Regulation
Turning to State and local developments in the field of airport
operation and regulation, it should be noted that all four of the State
aeronautical regulatory acts passed during 194186 make provision for
the licensing of airports by the State aeronautics commission. As
pointed out in last year's article,8 7 the previous statutes of this type
have not always provided for airport licensing.
/ Of particular interest to city attorneys in this connection is a
recent opinion of the Attorney General of Illinois" in a matter in-
volving conflicting airport regulations of a State agency and a county.
These were regulations of the State Aeronautics Commission as to
length of runways and regulations on the same subject contained in
the Cook County airport zoning ordinance of which so much was
said in our article last year.89 The question, of course, was which
should prevail and the Attorney General's ruling was that the State
regulations were paramount. The ground for this opinion was ap-
parently that the statute authorizing county zoning did not expressly
permit such regulation, though it did provide for county regulation
of the location of airports, whereas the act creating the State Aero-
nautics Commission did expressly authorize that Commission to reg-
ulate the size of airports.
Another interesting example of recent State airport regulation
is furnished by an order of the Minnesota Aeronautics Commission
granting an application of the University of Minnesota for a license
for the airport it had just esablished and denying that of a private
corporation for a license for a previously established airport located
about one mile from that of the University. 0 In this order, the Com-
mission found that it would be unsafe and not "in the public interest
or convenience" to grant both licenses and considered at some length
the qualifications of the two applicants, the nature of the two air-
86. Supra, n. 10.
87. Supra, n. 1, at p. 161.
88. 11. Att. Gen. Op. to Ill. Aeronautics Commission, April 1, 1941, 235 CCH
1901.
89. Supra, n. 1, at pp. 156, 161.
90. Order of Minn. Aeronautics Commission in the matter of the applications
of the University of Minn. end the Hannaford Aircraft Company for licenses for air-
ports near New Brighton, Minn.. Oct. 16, 1941.
AIRPORT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
ports, and other factors determining which airport should be per-
mitted to continue to exist.
Municipal Regulation
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, while there was no
legislation during 1941 expressly authorizing political subdivisions
to regulate the establishment, development, operation, and mainte-
nance of all airports within their territorial limits,9' eight States did
adopt legislation authorizing municipalities to regulate their own air-
ports. 92 Although this power is now expressly vested in political sub-
divisions in some thirty-two States, many of these also have legis-
lation providing for State regulation of all airports, including those
that are publicly-owned, the result being a possibility of conflicting
airport regulations as in the Illinois case mentioned above. 3
In addition to this legislation, there has been one opinion of a
State Attorney General on the related question whether or not a
statute authorizing cities to establish an airport beyond their city
limits carried with it, by implication, the power to regulate such air-
ports. In this opinion, which was given by the Attorney General of
Minnesota, it was held that such extraterritorial regulation was




While it would seem that the power to operate and maintain air-
ports is also inferred from the power to establish and develop them,
the State airport enabling acts usually contain express provisions
granting this power to the political subdivisions to which they apply.
This is true of all of the 1941 airport enabling acts extending the
power to establish airports to additional classes of political sub-
divisions.95
However, while many of these statutes, as previously indicated,99
authorize political subdivisions to issue bonds for acquisition of land
needed for airport purposes or for airport construction and develop-
91. See discussion of such regulation in last year's article, supra, n. 1, at p. 160.
92. Fla. L. 1941, c. 20861; Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 61 and S. B. 872; Kans. L. 1941,
S. B. 37; Mont. L. 1941, c. 54 ; Oreg. L. 1941, c. 189; S. D. L. 1941, H. B. 250; Tex.
L. 1941, S. B. 129.
93. Supra, n. 88.
94. Minn. Att. Gen. Op. to International Falls City Attorney, April 9, 1941,
235 ccH 1900.
95. Supra, n. 31.
96. Supra, n. 50.
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ment, only five expressly permit borrowing to defray the costs of
airport operation, maintenance, or repairY9
Airport Leases
It has generally been held that, in the absence of statutory au-
thority, municipalities cannot lease their airports to private opera-
torsY8 In this connection, however, it is interesting to note that the
Attorney General of Alabama last year ruled that the County of
Houston, acting in concert with the City of Dothan in acquiring lands
to be developed as a joint airport with Federal funds, could lease the
completed facility to the Federal Government, despite the fact that
there was no specific statutory authorization for the execution of
such a leaseY9 It was his opinion that a code provision stating that
the County governing body,shall "have control of all property be-
longing to the County" was sufficiently broad to authorize the pro-
posed lease to the Federal Government.
On the other hand, in the case of the City of Daytona Beach v.
Dygert'0 0 the City desired to have a two year lease of its airport to
the defendant declared void. In that case, the court held the lease
invalid even though, there was a special act permitting the City to
lease or otherwise dispose of land acquired for airport purposes to
private individuals. While this decision may have been correct, it
has been criticized'' for the ground upon which it purported to be
based, which was that the act did not constitute the express authori-
zation necessary for lease of land impressed with a public trust.
Perhaps the true reason for this decision is indicated by a recent
opinion of the Attorney General of California, 10 2 holding that a
County could not legally lease a portion of a hangar for a mere
nominal consideration. This ruling was based on a limitation in the
California Constitution that political subdivisions have no inherent
power to make gifts of public property.
Tort Liability
Another legal question in this general field is that whether
political subdivisions are liable for personal injuries or damages
97. Del. L. 1941. S. B. 207 (Spec. Act) ; Idaho L. 1941, c. 172 (1st class cities) ;
Mont. L. 1941, c. 54; Texas L. 1941, S. B. 129 (cities over 40,000) ; Vt. L. 1941, c. 54.
98. See collected cases In Report No. 42, National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers (April, 1939) at p. 3.
99. Ala. Att. Gen. Op. to Judge of Probate, Houston County, May 1, 1941,
235 CCH 1903.
100. 1 S. (2d) 170 (Fla., March 11, 1941).
101. See 12 Air Law Review 334 (July, 1941).
102. Calif. Att. Gen. Op. to Kern County Att., March 13, 1941, 235 CCH 1894.
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resulting from negligence of their employees or agents in operation
of their airports.10a This question was the subject of several inter-
esting developments during the year 1941.
In Peavey v. City of Miami'0 4 instructions to the jury to the
effect that the same degree of care should be exercised by the city
to be free from such liability as would be required of a private
airport proprietor were held correct; however, the jury found that
the defendant city was not negligent'0 5 and rendered a verdict against
the plaintiff. Opposed to this ruling is an opinion by the Attorney
General of Kentucky' 08 advising that operation of an airport by a
city is just as much a municipal, governmental function as mainte-
nance of a public park and that therefore a City so operating an
airport would be exempt from tort liability.
In addition, the year 1941 witnessed the passage of at least one
act, the sole 'purpose of which was to declare the operation of air-
ports to be a governmental function, 0 7 and also the decision of a
case construing a similar statute in another State, Abbott v. City of
Des Moines.0 This case was one of a suit brought against the City
by the owner of a plane which was damaged in a hangar explosion
caused by sparks from a City employee's welding torch. The court
held that there was no need to determine whether or not there was
negligence because a State statute places municipal airports in the
same category as public parks, operation of which is a governmental
function, thus making cities immune from suit for injuries resulting
from negligence in their operation.
(3) AIRPORT PROTECTION
As was pointed out in our article covering airport legal develop-
ments'during 1940,109 once an airport is established, it is highly
desirable, if not necessary, that it be protected against two threats
to its continued utility as an airport, and even to its existence as
such, these being the danger that its aerial approaches may be ob-
structed and the danger that it may be abated as a nuisance.
103. See discussion in Report 42, supra, n. 98, at p. 5.
104. 1 S. (2d) 614 (Fla., April 15, 1941).
105. The case holds that posting notice of runway repairs in CAA "Notices toAirmen" and outlining the dangerous areas with red lanterns at night was due care
and that the plaintiff's action in landing at the airport while known to be under
repair without first maneuvering for better orientation constituted contributory
negligence.
106. Ky. Att. Gen. Op. to Member of Danville Board of Council, Feb. 5, 1941,
235 CCH 1890.
107. Me. L. 1941, c. 243
108. 298 N. W. 649 (Iowa, June 17, 1941).
109. Supra, u. 1, at p. 154.
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Airport Zoning
Much was accomplished -during 1941 to guard against this first
danger, considerable progress having been made toward protection
of airport approaches by the airport zoning method. This progress
is largely attributable to the efforts of the Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istration and National Institute of Municipal Law Officers and other
organizations interested in the welfare of civil aviation, in encour-
aging the adoption of State and local legislation necessary to permit
effective and widespread utilization of this means.
Early in the year two sample airport zoning acts were released.
While in many respects similar to the two earlier drafts prepared
by the Institute, with the assistance of the CAA," ° these two model
acts contain certain new features not included in the original drafts,
which experience had shown to be necessary or otherwise desirable
in this type of legislation. One of these drafts contemplates placing
a measure of control in a State aviation body; the other, which was
prepared by the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, differs
from the first in that it.places full control of airport zoning in the
local political subdivisions. In all other respects the two drafts are
identical.
That there is a rapidly growing appreciation of the need for
airport zoning is seen in the fact that no less than 11 acts were
adopted in 1941 either prescribing airport zoning regulations or
authorizing an agency of the State Government or certain classes
of political subdivisions to adopt such regulations for the protection
of certain airports or types of airports."' In addition, it is note-
worthy that in two other States, airport zoning bills were passed by
the Legislature only to be vetoed by the Governor.11 2 When added
to the airport zoning acts already in existence," 3 the 11 adopted last
year raises the total of States now having legislation on the subject
to 23.
Of these 11 acts, two empower a State agency to adopt the
regulations,14 five authorize political subdivisions to zone in accord-
ance with approach plans adopted or approved by a State agency," 5
110. Report 42, supra, n. 98, and Report 59, National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers (Feb. 1940).
111. Ark. L. 1941, c. 116; Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 493; Me. L. 1941, c. 142; Mass. L.
1941, c. 537; Nebr. L. 1941, L. B. 495 ; N. H. L. 1941, c. 145; N. M. L. 1941, c. 171 ;
N. C. L. 1941, c. 240; Okla L. 1941, S. B. 153; Oreg. L. 1941, H. B. 362; Wyo. L.
1941, c. 110.
112. Mich. L. 1941, H. B. 551 and Pa. L. 1941, S. B. 913.
113. See Report of Airports Committee, supra, n. 1, at p. 155.
114. Okla. L. 1941 S. B 153 and Oreg. L. 1941, H. B. 362.
115. I1. L. 1941, §. B. 493; Mass. L. 1941, c. 537; Nebr. L. 1941, L. B. 495;
N. H. L. 1941, c. 145; N. M. L. 1941, c. 171.
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and four merely authorize municipalities or other political sub-
divisions to zone."" Altogether, it appears that all but four of these
statutes 117 were patterned after one or another of the zoning acts
referred to above.
It is not possible at this time to state how many airports have
been or will be protected under the authority of these measures;
however, the volume of requests for information in this field received
by the CAA and the Institute indicates a growing realization on the
part of city officials that the aerial approaches of their airports must
be protected against obstruction by the airport zoning method.
Moreover, it appears that Congress is awakening to this need.
This is indicated by the following statements contained in the recent
report of the Nichols Committee discussed above :118
"The third cause of accidents is on a parity with the
second, but is subject only indirectly to remedial action by
the Congress, and that is, the inherent defects in, obstruc-
tions upon, and hazards about, the existing airports. Your
committee believe that the only direct action the Congress
can take on these matters is to authorize the licensing and
grading (sic) of airports by the Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istrator, and thereby limit the use of many airports to day-
light and good weather operations until such time as the
cities and States in which they are situated shall take the
necessary steps to insure the safety of interstate commerce
This will require the enactment by many State legislatures
of enabling acts empowering cities and other subdivisions
of government to zone all approaches to their airports."
In this connection, it should be noted that in 1941 twelve States
adopted legislation authorizing acquisition, by grant, purchase, or
condemnation, of air rights or easements where such action is neces-
sary in order to secure the removal or lowering of an existing ob-
struction or the property is so close to theairport boundary that
regulation of the height of structures thereon would constitute an
unlawful taking of property without compensation. This legislation
includes one of the airport zoning acts which are not patterned after
one of the model acts," 9 all of those which are,'12 and in addition
four acts not authorizing airport zoning.
12
1
116. Ark. L. 1941, c. 116; Me. L. 1941, c. 142; N. C. L. 1941, c. 240; Wyo. L.
1941, c. 110.
117. Nebr. L. 1941, L. B. 495; Okla. L. 1941, S. B. 153; Oreg. L. 1941, H. B.
362; Wyo. L. 1941, c. 110.
118. Supra, n. 73.
119. Okla. L. 1941, S. B. 153.
120. Ill. L. 1941, S. B. 493; Me. L. 1941, c. 142: Mass. L. 1941, c. 537; N. H. L.
1941, c. 145; N. M. L. 1941, c. 171; N. C. L. 1941, c. 240.
121. Fla. L. 1941, c. 20861; Kans. L. 1941, S. B. 37, S. B. 38; Oreg. L. 1941.
c. 189.
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Airports as Nuisances
As is stated in 2 C. J. S. 909, "An airport, landing field, or flying
school is not a nuisance per se, although it may become a nuisance
from the manner of its construction or operation; in other words, it
can be regarded as a nuisance only if located in an unsuitable place
or if operated so as to interfere unreasonably with the comfort of
adjoining owners.' 122
In the past year under the impetus of the Federal airport pro-
gram, there was a marked trend toward locating airports so that
they would not constitute an abatable nuisance. Under the extra-
territorial authority granted by the State statutes, municipalities are
establishing their airports at sites farther away from built- up areas
where future expansion will be possible at a lower cost, where
approach obstructions are fewer, and where there is less danger
that the airports will become nuisances. Moreover, increased atten-
tion is being given to planning and regulating the location of air-
ports with reference to other physical features of the community
in such a way as to hold conflicts of land uses to a minimum.123 As
a result, it is believed that the day is not far distant when airport
abatement suits will be a thing of the past.
It is interesting to note in this connection that in the case of
Miles v. Lee,1 24 the plantiffs raised the point that the expansion of
the Louisville Municipal Airport would be extremely objectionable
to the residents of the surrounding vicinity which was an entirely
residential district, and would "seriously interfere with the peace
of the many thousands of people living within this area and seriously
and materially destroy the values of their properties and homes."
While it was not affirmatively pled that this airport constituted a
nuisance, the court observed, in passing, that on the basis of the
above circumstances, the plaintiffs could not charge the maintenance
or creation of a nuisance or seek an injunction to abate or prohibit it.
On the other hand, it has been reported that on January 27, 1941,
final action was taken on a petition filed by certain taxpayers and
the Board of Education of Alhambra, California, to abate flying at
the Alhambra Airport. 2 5 A decree was issued on that date enjoining
further use of the airport for pilot training, and limiting future use
to emergency landings and to the actual business needs of two air-
craft manufacturing companies having plants adjacent to the airport.
122. See article cited supra, n. 1, at p. 160.
123. See the discussion of such planning and regulation in the article cited
supra, n. 1, at pp. 156-162.
124. Supra, n. 61.
125. See Report of Committee on Airports, supra, n. 1, at p. 159.
AIRPORT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 139
Conclusions
It can be said by way of summary that the year 1941 was the
renaissance for municipal airports. The Fedeal Government for
the first time, by direct appropriation recognized the integral part
which the municipal airport plays in our civil and military life. The
State legislatures were quick to provide needed airport enabling
legislation. And the municipalities, counties, and other political sub-
divisions continued their contribution to civil aeronautics and the
national defense, often at considerable sacrifice, by providing civil
and military aviation with adequate airport facilities.
